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THE MARCH OF WAR
THE INVASION OF SICILY
ON May 13, 1943, the fighting on KorthAfrican soil had como to an end.According to a statement by WinstoLi
Churchill made on June ,the British First
and Eighth Armies had 10 t 35,000 men in
the course of the fighting in Tunisia (not
including that in Libya), and on May 28
Washington announced the American losses
to have been 18,600. The actual losses of the
Allies were probably much higher.
ALLIED PREPARATIO:S
After the elimination of the "\x.is bridge.
bead in Tunisia, the Allies, constantly
prompted by Moscow, prepared for the
much·talked-of invasion of Europe. Ail'
mids on Italy and her islands, which had
been carried out regularly since early this
year, grew more violent in a 'udden crescendo,
while the Anglo.Ameriean 10. ses, especially
in multiengined bomber, mounted cor-
respondingly. A map in the July issue of
this magazine (pp. 24/25) shows the citie
and districts chiefly affected. Sicily. Sardin-
ia. and southern Italy were the main
targets, and such places a.s Palermo, Messina,
and Naples experienced weeks with one or
more attacks each day.
By the end of May the small islands in
the waters betwoon Sicily llnd Africa had
become the main objectives, and after
violent att.acks Pantelleria., LampeduSB,
LinoM, and Lampione were occupied on
June II, 12, 13, and 14 respccti\·ely.
Meanwhile, Axis recOlmaissance planes
reported concentrations of warships, trans-
ports, and Innding vessels aU along the
southern Me<litcrranean coast from Gibraltar
to •'yTia. The Allied Mcdit rranean fleet
was boL t<-red by a number of units com-
prising American warship and aircraft car-
riers. It was estimated that sume 44 infantry
divisions, 15 to ~O tank formations, and ~
air-borne land.ing di \Tisions were concentrated.
while ample 8upplies were tored in aU
important embarkation ports. The Allied
prMB mentiolled a force of one million men
ready to be nnleashed. Enrly in July,
Sicily seemed the most likely object oC an
invasion.
TEtE AXIS POSITION
Since the Axis command had to post the
troops a \-ailabl in the Mediterra·nean a.rea.
not only in Sicily but along th whole length
of the European :outhern flank (as described
in detail in OUI' last issue), only a limited
number of these troops could be employed
for Sicily. The A..xis also had another
reason for limiting the number of troop on
Sicily: if the Allies were t<> decide on a large-
scale attack on icily-for which there were
many indioation -by making use of their
superior naval and a.ir fleets, tllis island
might become a trap for the Axis troopH
should the enemy succeed eit.h r in capturing
Messina by land or in gaining air supremacy
over t.be Strait of Messina.
In every iJlVasion attempt the Allies had
the advantage of being able to chooso the
place and time and concentrate their forccs
in one or two spots, while the Axis had to
spread its troops along 60.000 kilometers of
coast line. This made the d fense of islands
such as icily and Sardinia a precariou
matter. For while on the Continent, troops
could be rusbed to the points of inva ion
with compara.tive speed and safety, thu
situation was less favorable in tbe cas of
i lands in view of the .Allied superiority in
ships and plane. The Axis ommand wa
fully awar of t he fact that it would b
extremely difficult to hold. 'icily aaainst an
all·out Allied attack. Hence the task of
the Sicilian defense, if it were unable to
throw the invlUlers ba k into t,lle sea, was
to make th Allie-s pay such a heavy prj 0
in men, arlUam nt, and ship that the
enemy's eagernc to continu this kind of
warfare would be 81.'riously affected.
The number ofAx.i . tro ps stationed in
. ieil v at the moment of inva ion ha" so far
not been divulged. At any rate, the figure
of 300,000 Italians and 100.000 Germans
mentioned by the Allies seem gro Iy exag·
gerated. At a time when the Allied forcell
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landed on Sicily were believed to be 11
divisions German sources declared the de·
fenders to be outnumbered. This would
put the number of Axis troops on the
island at Jess than 11 di,ision .
Given the number of troops available for
Sicily and the fact that the length of Sicily's
coast is 1,115 kilometers (three times the
distance from London to Pari), the Axis
was confronted by the tu k of employing its
forces to the best possible advantage. It
could either post its troops at various sec·
tors along the coast, thereby running the
risk, howe"er, that the landings might take
place at other points, 80 that the neCCll8MY
regrouping of forees would cost a lot of
time; or it could concentrate its troops ill
the interior of the iBland in order to throw
them from there at maximum speed against
the enemy wherever he might have lauded.
Events have shown that the Axis command
decided in favor of this second method.
The coast itself Wl18 occupied only by weak
coastal units, consisting mainly of second
resenes, while the units concentrated in the
interior waited until the center of gravity
of the Allied attack had been ascertained
and could be opposed with full force.
THE L.~"lDING
When on July 9, at 10.20 p.m., the port
of 'yracuse on the e&'lt coaat of Sicily waa
sheUed, the Axis comma nd ordered a general
alert throughout the island. In the early
hours of the following day, parachute forma-
tions were landed in the sparsely populated
80utheastern corner of icily. lnlmediately
afterwards, naval and air attacks were
directed against omparatively long stret{lhes
of the eastern, western and 80utbern coast
line. Bombs and broadsides from naval
gum silenced coastal batteries with a hail of
fire, and behind the curtain of this barrage
men and supplies were put Il hore. The sea
swa.rmed with vcasels of aJj sizc8 ami descrip.
tion. According to R.oosevelt's speech of
July 2 160,000 men with 14,000 vehicles,
1,800 guns and 800 tanks were arried to
Si ily in 3,000 ship .
Thank to the \igilance of the Axis for es
and the population, Dlost of the enemy
troops who had landed by parachute were
annihilated-some ,000 men within the
first 24 hours. The Allied attempt quickly
to expand the bridgeheads toward the
interior by linking up the forCe8 landed
from ships with those landed from planes
waa thus frustrated. Likewise the foothold.s
which the Allies had gained on the west
coa·t between Marsala and Cape F'eto were
cleared by immediate count{lf&Ction on the
part of the coastal defense. On the other
two sectors-t.he Licata/Gela area of t.ho
BOuth coast and the southern thinl of the
east coast-the invaders also met with
stubborn resi tanoe. But, by reason of
the enormous weight of their superior naval
ILnd air forcos, they managed to hold their
bridgeheads and slowly t.o pre inllllld,
while the opem.t.ive reservel:l of the Axis
rushed up to oppose them.
THE BATTLE BgGrNS
Reinforced by new divisions, the British
Eighth Army under General Montgomery
made some territorial gains from ita three
bridgeheads in Pacbino, Syracuse, and
Augusta, where four divisions had been
landed originally. The right wing of this
army aimed north, while the left flank drove
toward Ragusa to effect a junction with the
newly formed American Seventh Army
under General George Patton. Of this army,
three divisiom including 80me Canadian
units had originally lauded between Licata
and Cape Scaramania, mainly in Licata and
in the Bay of Gela. On July 12 and 13,
additional divisions were put aahore. By
July 23 German 80urces claimed that a.
total of six American and five British
divisions had disembarked.
From the strategie point of view, it waa.
obvious from the outset which part of the
island would seem the most important to.
both side -the northeastern corner, rough-
ly forming the triangle Ca.pe Orlando/Cata-
niafMessina. It was clear that the Allies
woUld try to reach Mcssina as quickly as
pos iLle to cut off the rest of the Axis forces.
on tho island and that the Axis, on the other
hand, would make its main stand here.
The task of reaching Messina-the most
important object of the entire Sicilian cam-
paign-was entrusted to the right wing of
the Eighth Army, which la.tter was con-
sidered the crack force among the invading
troops. As soon as it had been dis-
embarked, the Eighth Army started on ita
race toward Catania, the gateway to the
narrow coastal corridor leading to MCBSina
between the sea a.nd the giant ma.'Yiif of
Mount Etna (3,279 meters high). The other
Allied divisions pressed north more slowly.
Attempts to speed up the advance by dIe
employment of paratroops in the rear of
the defenders failed, as they were wiped out.
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a large number of enemy fighters and
bombers were brought down.
In his speech of July 2, Presid nt
Roosevelt declared that t,he Allies had been
planning a whole year for the 'icilian cam-
paign. If uch a weU-pr pared attack against
one of the mo 1. distant outposts of Europe,
has not, after three weeks of fighting,
produced any grea.ter results than those
delleribed above, then Europe can face
future invasions with calm confidence.
The Allied operations are under tbe
supreme command of General Eisenhower,
whose second-in.command is General
Alexander. The Allied air fleets are directed
by the British Air Marshal .'ir Arthur
l;edder, to whom the British Air Marshal
Sir Arthllr Conningham and Vice Air Mar-
shal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd as well as the Ameri-
can Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz and
Major General James Doolit.tle, (who com-
manded t.he US bomber attack on Japan
on April 18, 1942) are subordinated. Naval
operations are being conducted under the
command of the Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Andrew Browne CuDllingham; the
American naval forces are headed by
Vice-Admiral Henry Hewitt.
Except for the Italian commamlcr of the
ixth Army, General Gllzzoni, no names of
Axis generals have been announced so far.
•••
HEAVY LOSSES AT SEA
The resistancc of the Axis wa not confined
to land fighting. :From the out t Italian and
German planes and ubmarines attacked and
destroyed many Allicd war ships, transports,
and landing barges off the f:;icilian coast.
On July 13 and 14 alone, 5 destroyers were
sunk and ~ cruisers heavily damaged, apart
from the damage sustained by some smaller
wa.rships. The Allied air flects were alw
cngaged by Italian and German airmen and
antiaircraft units. In spite of the great
numerical superiority of the AlJied air forces,
The most violent fighting broke out when,
on July 13, the Briti'h reachcd the plain
(about 15 by 20 kilometers in extent) lying
to the south of Catania. As the Axis forc-
es, with the Hermawl Goering division as
their backbone, slowly withdrew northward,
the Eighth Army found it elf in the flat
plain fighting again t an enemy entrenched
in the mountains bordering it on the north.
The Briti h a.t·ta ks became co tlier every day
and practically came to a halt by July 25.
Shielded by the forces at Catauia, Axis
troops meanwhile evacuated the western
part of the island, withdra.wing to the north-
eo. tern triangle. The Americans followed
the retiring enemy and proudly announced
great victories. Real fighting, however,
did not begin for thcm until they reached
the line San Stefano/Agira, approximately
on July 26. By the end of July the struggle
for the strategic triangle had begtrn.
